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1. Introduction
This paper is a contribution to the debate on children’s perspective taking
skills. Although much research in the past 50 years has been dedicated to
analysing children’s egocentrism as well as their early emerging skills in
adapting to their interaction partners, one question which has been largely
neglected is which kinds of adaptation are related to the different functions
of children’s utterances in their everyday life. Whereas psychological and
psycholinguistic experiments (e.g., Marvin et al. 1976, Sabbagh & Baldwin
2001) have contributed answers in considerable detail regarding the
question as to in which experimental settings children exhibit which kinds
of perspective taking skills (linguistic or other), observing children in their
home context reveals the kinds of interaction with which children are
concerned in the surroundings where they learn their mother tongue. There,
they deal daily with interaction partners who may possess either more (like
mothers) cognitive and linguistic skills than they do themselves, or less
(like younger siblings), resulting in abundant situations where the children
can adapt, or fail to adapt, to their interaction partners’ needs. In such
situations, children’s perspective taking skills are revealed through their
abilities to adapt linguistically as well as conceptually to their interaction
partner. This study concentrates on conceptual perspective taking, i.e.,
children’s growing ability to take into account their partners’ informational
status. While research on children’s theory of mind (e.g., Wellman 1990)
has largely focused on children’s ability to assess others’ knowledge and
beliefs, the question asked here is which kinds of speech in children’s
everyday life demand such ability to assess others’ knowledge, and which
kinds of adaptation to the child’s interaction partner are related to different
functions of child speech.
To address this question, a home-based longitudinal study is presented.
The utterances of one child concerning one specific domain are analysed
with regard to their functions, based on Halliday’s (1975; 1994) concepts.
Each of these functions is then specified regarding its relevance to the
question of a child’s perspective taking and adaptation abilities.
The paper is structured as follows. To begin with, previous
psycholinguistic insights on the subject of children’s perspective taking
                                                           
1 I am grateful to John Bateman and an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments on
an earlier version of this paper.
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abilities are briefly summarized, and the kinds of methods applied in the
relevant studies are outlined and contrasted with purely naturalistic home
observation as adopted in the present study. The following section deals
with Hallidayan theory, highlighting those aspects of the theory which
promise to be interesting for the question at hand. Then, the longitudinal
home study is presented. One central conclusion of the paper will finally
be, in simple terms, the following: Perspective taking is revealed whenever
it is relevant – but maybe it is not relevant as often (or early in life) as
might be expected.
2. How Children Learn to Take Other People’s Perspectives
The roots of the perspective taking debate go back to Piaget’s (e.g.,
1947/1950) famous claim that children are predominantly egocentric up to
the age of seven. This means basically that they are unable to take others’
conceptual perspectives, as well as unable to differentiate between different
interlocutors’ communicative or informational needs. For example, in his
well-known “three-mountain tasks,” Piaget asked young children questions
which required taking other people’s point of view, overwhelmingly
resulting in failure.
Piaget also conducted analyses on children’s language, concluding that
nearly half of his subjects’ utterances served functions other than
communicative (Flavell 1963). Characteristic of this egocentric speech is a
lack of a discernible communicative aim, as well as a lack of any attempt to
check whether others are listening, or any attempt to inform, persuade or
make others do something. Moreover, there is no perspective taking or
adaptation of the message to the listener’s informational needs or input
capacity. The explanations and discussions among children of 4 to 6 years
show that they still have systematic difficulties taking another person’s
point of view. It is hard for them to make new information intelligible to
others and to clarify misunderstandings.
However, children talking audibly to themselves without addressing
anybody are not necessarily egocentric. A different interpretation of this
behaviour is that it is to be viewed as the transition from outer to inner
speech: it mostly occurs at times when the children are confronted with a
problem (Vygotsky 1934/1977). The children acknowledge the situation,
make a “verbal copy” of it and reproduce associations of previous
experiences in order to find a solution. Later authors (e.g., Miller 1951)
found that children, rather than talking to themselves a greater amount of
the time, use language to serve informational functions in two-thirds of
their speech. The transfer of information is enhanced by the ability to take
another person’s perspective (Billmann-Mahecha 1990).
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Today, among experts it is commonly agreed that even very young
children exhibit much more perspective taking competence than Piaget
assumed. One important outcome of the egocentrism debate is the insight
that, while the transfer of information is not always a central function of
speech, effective transfer of information requires the ability to account for
the interlocutor’s state of knowledge or belief. Thus, at least a certain
amount of adaptation to the interaction partner is necessary in
communication situations involving the transfer of information.
Piaget’s theory had great impact on psychological and psycholinguistic
research. In the following decades, many experiments (e.g., Shatz &
Gelman 1973; Sachs & Devin 1975) were designed to falsify Piaget’s
hypotheses. The effect was that it was worked out in detail what children
learn, step by step, until they reach adult abilities.
Gradually, the focus of research shifted to children’s development of
what is called a Theory of Mind (Wellman 1990). This concerns mainly
conceptual perspective taking, such as children’s acknowledgement of
other people’s minds, their desires and beliefs, etc. The beginnings of
conceptual perspective taking have been shown to emerge at only 9 months
(Reddy 1991): infants start playing with others’ intentions and
expectations, and they like to perform actions that amuse others, even
differentiating between different interaction partners. During their third
year of life, children learn to understand that human actions are caused by
their emotions and desires, which is displayed, for instance, in their pretend
play (Wellman 1990; Astington & Gopnik 1991). The understanding that
people are also influenced by what they believe (maybe falsely) emerges at
age 3 or 4 (Bartsch & Wellman 1989; Moses & Flavell 1990).
Regarding linguistic perspective taking, it has been pointed out that
early non-egocentric traits are revealed in the communicative cooperation
and coordination of turns, such as waiting for another person’s
confirmation. Such skills emerge already at 18 months (Garvey 1977). The
ability to follow the principle of relevance, denoting the interlocutors’
mutual effort to focus on a shared communicative goal, emerges gradually.
At the beginning of this development, infants succeed in securing their
listeners’ attention almost from birth (Keenan & Schieffelin 1975).
Gradually, they learn to take others’ communicative aims into account, and
act and talk accordingly.
Concerning the linguistic form of utterances, adaptation to the
interaction partner’s needs is a basic conversational skill that children
already acquire from the age of two, as psycholinguistic research carried
out mainly in the 1970’s and 80’s showed. Children soon learn to adjust
their speech to different listeners such as adult, peer, baby, and baby doll
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(e.g., Shatz & Gelman 1973; Sachs & Devin 1975; Dunn & Kendrick
1982). Towards younger listeners, especially siblings, there are some
characteristics in the speech of three- or four-year olds that are reminiscent
of motherese (the kind of language mothers use when talking to their young
children). For instance, they use shorter sentences than towards grown-ups
and fewer relative clauses or coordinated main clauses, but more
expressions to interest the child. With their peers, the children use the same
kind of language as towards adults.
3. Ways of Studying Children’s Abilities
Most of the results presented above were obtained in experimental, i.e.
laboratory studies, where children are presented with specific tasks to
solve, and fairly specific skills are addressed. However, this is inevitably an
unnatural situation, which may create a bias, causing children to act
differently than they would at home. In the worst case, this bias might
result in a researcher’s conclusion that the children are not capable of
fulfilling the task and therefore do not possess the relevant skills, although
in comparable everyday situations they might, in fact, rather naturally
succeed in similar tasks.
In order to avoid such a bias, some researchers employ a different
method, namely home observation. In such studies, children are observed
in their homes mostly for a few hours monthly. In most cases, the studies
involve a stranger to the family who acts as observer or as technical
assistant, e.g., handling the video camera. Often, also in the homes specific
tasks are conducted. There, such tasks are assumed to be more comfortable
for the children. Whether tasks are involved or not, it is obvious that it is
impossible to attain the same degree of control in the homes as in the
laboratory. However, the amount of experimental bias is reduced in favor
of more naturalness for the children.
Occasionally, longitudinal studies of children in their homes have been
carried out which do not involve any strangers at all. While several famous
researchers recorded their children’s utterances using first paper and pencil
(e.g., the diaries of Clara and William Stern, see Deutsch 1991; Halliday
1975), and later on more sophisticated equipment such as audiotape
(Ramge 1976), to my knowledge there are no such studies which explicitly
address children’s emerging perspective taking skills in their homes.
Although various elementary factors have been pointed out in which
laboratory settings differ from home (Schaffer 1989), studies which
combined home-based observation and laboratory experiments have
demonstrated a high consistency in results (Howe & Ross 1990; Dunn et al.
1991; Youngblade & Dunn 1995). For instance, a positive correlation was
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found between naturalistic home observations of preschoolers’ sibling-
directed internal state language and sibling-directed affective behaviour in
comparison with laboratory measures of perspective taking abilities.
Nevertheless, specific aspects of perspective taking, especially those
dealing with children’s spontaneous utterances as in the present study, may
only be addressed at home, while others (such as those investigating fairly
specific skills) are better addressed in the laboratory.
4. Interaction Partners at Home
At home, children are confronted with different interaction partners. This
fact constitutes a kind of challenge to the children that would be much
harder to control in a laboratory in which all of the participants are
strangers to the children. Primary caretakers, which in Western societies
are often the children’s mothers, are most used to dealing with the child:
they understand much of what they say, and they adapt their own speech to
the child’s abilities. Other people spend much, but not as much time with
the child, such as fathers, grandparents, or other caretakers. Such people
have just as much knowledge as primary caretakers, but less experience in
adapting to the child (Barton & Tomasello 1994). Younger siblings might
provide the greatest challenge to a young child at home: they know less, so
conceptual adaptation would be necessary for a young child, and they
cannot themselves adapt to the older child.
Thus, in interaction situations within families, cognitively and
linguistically inexperienced children communicate with different, but well-
known, interaction partners with either more or less cognitive and linguistic
skills than themselves. In contrast, adults talking to each other are usually
on a similar level with respect to their cognitive and communicative skills.
This difference may have consequences at two levels of linguistic
interaction, namely, form and content of an utterance.
How a child learns to differentiate between diverse kinds of linguistic
interaction can best be determined by comparing situations involving
various interaction partners. The present study focuses on the interaction
between one child of one and a half years at the beginning of the study until
nearly four years of age, and his mother and younger brother. Naturally, the
brother, who is 17 months younger than the target child, has even less
communicative competence and less knowledge of the world than him,
while the mother is more skilled (see fig.1).
Thus, the child faces two different interaction partners with different
communicative needs. In specific situations, knowledge about the
informational status of the interaction partner is relevant. This study
analyses in which kinds of situations knowledge about the other person’s
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knowledge enhances communication, and how these factors are
increasingly accounted for by the child in the course of the study.
Interaction with the
younger brother










adaptation is difficult and not
necessary for the child
Content and
information
brother has less knowledge
about the world than child:
Conveyance of information
is easy in principle for the
older child, but may not be
accepted
mother has more knowledge
about the world than child:
Conveying information to the
mother is difficult for the
child
Figure 1: Different linguistic interaction situations with different
partners
5. A Hallidayan Perspective
Although it is clear enough from previous research as outlined above that
children from a very early age learn to adapt to their interaction partner, the
question remains unresolved which kinds of adaptation are related to
different functions of children’s utterances in their everyday life. As
pointed out above, not all utterances serve predominantly to convey
information; however, informing effectively requires cognitive adaptation
to the interaction partner. The contents of children’s utterances can only be
analyzed via home observation, as experiments trigger specific kinds of
utterances, thus biasing the child’s linguistic behavior. Halliday (1975)
presented a detailed functional analysis of child speech at home. His
framework (Halliday 1994) will be used in the following to address the
question of how children gradually learn to use language with the effect of
conveying information to others.
According to Halliday, adult language always serves three
metafunctions simultaneously, which he labels the ideational,
interpersonal, and textual metafunction, respectively. In his terms, the
ideational metafunction involves structuring the clause as a representation,
construing a kind of process in ongoing human experience, and
representing reality in a specific way. The interpersonal metafunction is
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characterised as the “intruder function,” employed for transactions between
speaker and listener: the clause reflects the speakers’ relationship to their
interaction partners, and their way of confronting them with the reality
reflected by the ideational function. Finally, the clause’s message is
structured by the textual metafunction, creating relevance to the context of
the utterance. Here, the focus is on how speakers structure their interaction
textually, how they relate their utterances to each other and to the wider
discourse context. These issues are reflected in the clause’s Given-New and
Theme-Rheme structures. Thus, this metafunction reflects the way
information is conveyed to others, based on what the speaker believes is
new or given in the discourse context, and how that information is to be
structured.
Children do not have all these functions at their disposal when they
start communicating. Each of their utterances initially serves only one
function, and they gradually explore all of the three functions, until each
utterance involves all three functions (in different weightings). One reason
for this initial one-dimensionality is that children’s early utterances do not
contain enough grammatical structure to be able to represent more than one
function at a time. For example, a one-word utterance like “Mummy”
might serve to attract Mummy’s attention on an interpersonal level, but no
more than that. “Doggy,” on the other hand, may represent the presence of
the dog in the child’s visual field. In contrast, utterances containing more
words, and more structure, are  increasingly suitable for conveying more
than one meaning at the same time.
According to Halliday, the textual metafunction is special in that it is
intrinsic to language. Conveying information via language means using
language as an alternative to experience, in addition to a mere reflection of
it. It is possible to represent the world non-verbally (e.g., by pointing); it is
equally possible to contact and influence other people without words (e.g.,
by crying), but it is impossible to convey information without some kind of
symbol system (such as language) in a broad sense.
Because of this, Halliday claims that the textual metafunction is
irrelevant to children in the beginning, when they are primarily concerned
with the here-and-now. Thus, this element of children’s speech emerges
only after the other main functions, representative (ideational) and
interpersonal, have been acquired.
 Similar claims have been put forward by Givòn (1984), who observes
that children’s discourse mostly consists of single propositions, and that it
is predominantly manipulative. According to Givòn, there is no need for an
exchange of information, as the background is shared by all participants;
the discourse topics are present, and the participants share a high degree of
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empathy. Adult communication is based on the informative speech act
because the opposite is true.
This is the issue explored in the present study in more detail.
6. Longitudinal Study
The present study investigates the interaction of one child, beginning at
eighteen months until nearly four years of age, with his mother and his
younger brother. The study focuses on one specific area of talk, namely, the
target child talking about his brother. The data are evaluated in relation to
Halliday’s (1975; 1994) analysis of linguistic functions. Halliday’s
framework is used to relate the content of the target child’s utterances to
underlying metafunctions. While it is expected that a development in
content should also be reflected in linguistic structure, a detailed analysis
on a structural level is beyond the scope of the present study. Instead, the
specific relationship of each speech function to the question whether the
child is able to take into account his listener’s informational status is
explored.
6.1 Procedure
The interaction of J, a German boy, with his family members (mostly, his
mother and his brother L, who is 17 months younger than J) was watched
closely by his mother over several years, with a special focus on his
abilities to take his interlocutor’s perspective. A diary was kept, and regular
video sessions were taken. The video sessions were conducted about once a
month, covering about one hour of interaction which was not controlled,
i.e., typical home interaction was recorded. Relevant parts of the video
recordings were transcribed, taking into account the situational context.
The data were evaluated qualitatively; relevant situations were analyzed
according to what they suggest about the child’s ability to adapt to his
interaction partner. In the following, the main findings concerning speech
functions are presented together with anecdotal evidence.
6.2 Conceptual Perspective Taking
At 29 months, J was perfectly able to play the role of a messenger, as the
following example illustrates:
Mother to J: [“Go to Dad, ask him if he is hungry.”] J goes to the
room where his father is, and asks (with raising intonation):
“Hunger?” [“hungry?”]. There is no clear answer, so he asks
again: “du Hunger?” [“you hungry?”] His father’s answer is Yes,
and J says: “gut” [“okay”] and leaves the room again, shuts the
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door behind him and tells his mother: “Papa Hunger” [“Dad
hungry”].
Already some weeks before this, J was able to inform two different
people in one situation according to the situational needs:
J gives L the bottle back, which L had thrown away, and says:
“da, Tuka. dricke Lalet.” [“there, L. drink bottle”]. L holds the
bottle the wrong way, J informs him: “kehrt um!” [“wrong
way!”]. Then something leaks out, and J tells his mother: “Tuka
keckert, Mama. bauber!” [“L spill, Mum. clean!”]
In this situation, J seemed to be perfectly aware of the state of
knowledge of the people involved, and how they should be informed (e.g.,
his mother, at that moment busy with cooking, needed to be informed in
order to clean up. Thus, for her, the information is new). How did he learn
to do this?
According to Halliday’s (1975) and Givòn’s (1984) findings outlined
above, children do not often feel the need to convey information at all.
Their speech, in the beginning, does not have the effect of informing, but
rather represents reality and/or reflects the interpersonal relationship to the
children’s interaction partners.
In order to analyze the functions of natural interaction within the
family context, I concentrated on one specific area of talk, namely, J’s talk
about his younger brother. The reason for choosing this area is that there
were no obvious reasons why J should talk about the brother at all, other
than informing people about L’s doings, as such talk is not suitable for
satisfying any personal needs (which has been claimed to be one of the
main reasons why young children talk at all). In fact, however, during the
early years, J altogether talked more about L than to him. The functions of
these utterances, as far as they are discernible, are revealing concerning the
development of J’s speech functions, as well as with respect to his
understanding of his interlocutors’ informational needs.
6.3 Ideational / Representational Function: Comments on Experience
Right after L was born, J commented on his presence. At times, it was not
clear whether J addressed his utterance to an interlocutor or not. J put his
experience into words, glad about his knowledge of language and of his
grasp of the experience. This corresponds to Halliday’s ideational function.
No information was conveyed, and very often, there apparently was no
addressee. At 18 months, for instance, J kept muttering “kuka” (J’s version
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of L’s name), whenever he heard him, played with him, etc. At 24 months,
the comments had become linguistically somewhat more sophisticated2, as
in the following example:
J [puts on a hat; walks over to L, mutters to himself]: “kuka”
["L"]
J [puts hat on L’s head]: “kuka hut” [“L hat”]
Such (rather non-emotional) comments on experience were most
common during the stage of rapid vocabulary expansion.
6.4 Interpersonal Function: Involved Comments Directed at an
Interlocutor
When J reached the age of 30 months, J’s comments were mostly directed
to other people, and they increasingly reflected clear intentions. Also, J’s
emotional involvement was increasingly discernible in his comments
directed to his mother, as in the following example at the age of 29 months:
J runs from one side of the high chair to the other, and both laugh
aloud. J points to L, looks at his mother and says: "Kuka latte
putt" ["L laughs his head off"]
This utterance seems to express a desire to share an emotionally loaded
experience with an interlocutor, corresponding to Halliday’s interpersonal
function merged with representational elements. Simple, apparently non-
emotional comments (which did not require an interlocutor), as described
above, were characteristic for a specific developmental phase, and then
they disappeared. In contrast, comments expressing emotional involvement
did not disappear, although they occurred with a somewhat higher
frequency during the time in J’s early years when he was easily excited.
Sharing emotion is a kind of communication that is, of course, important to
grown-ups as well.
The interpersonal metafunction, in Halliday’s terms, contains more
than simply sharing emotion. Here, the focus is on the fact that there was a
distinct development from the simple representation of reality to a
discernible desire to share exciting elements of this reality with an
interlocutor. A detailed analysis of specific linguistic elements should
                                                           




reveal how this higher-level development is reflected linguistically;
however, this is not the aim of the present paper.
In the previous stage, J did not seem to mind whether there was an
interlocutor or not. Now, in contrast, he approached his interlocutors
directly, apparently trying to share some excitement via language. In the
literature, this kind of communication has been called an attempt at
“meeting others’ minds” (Bretherton et al. 1981), providing insights about
the child’s “theory of mind” which at this point at least contains the
assumption that other people do have minds that the child can meet.
However, this kind of communication does not have the effect of
conveying new information to the child’s interlocutor(s) (whether or not
this should be intended).
6.5 Starting to Inform: Explanations and Elaborations
At 27 months, J started to talk about his younger brother, or about his own
interaction with L, by giving some kind of explanation or elaboration with
regard to a present situation, as in the following entry:
J feeds L, i.e., he hands over single peas, even though L bites into
his fingers from time to time. J’s comment: "Kuka mag Erpe" ["L
likes peas"]
In such examples, J’s utterance conveyed more than what was obvious
in the discourse situation. J did not seem to want to share emotion, but
rather to expand on reality. Increasingly, such utterances served as
meaningful information to explain J’s own or L’s actions, as in the
following entry noted at two years nine months:
L is in the pram, J stands beside him. J moves L’s cap upwards
and says to his mother: "hab ich Müttüt hocheschiebt! besser
sehen tann!" ["I moved up the cap! can see better!"]
Note that J’s two-clause utterance contains meaningful textual
structure: the second clause is an enhancement of the first (a reason is given
for the action represented in the first clause). Thus, explanations and
elaborations serve three metafunctions at once, as adult language –
according to Halliday – regularly does. The message function of language
is discovered by the child later than the other functions. In explanations and
elaborations of present (and to the interlocutor obvious) situations, it is
there, but it does not seem to be predominant. Giving explanations and
elaborations does not necessarily require taking other’s point of view, as
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the speaker does not provide new information to an uninformed
interlocutor, but simply expands on what is directly visible in the discourse
situation.
6.6 Conveyance of Information
At about the same age, J started to utter sentences that informed his mother
about facts she did not know. In the following example, J seems to
understand the deeper intention of his mother’s utterance and answers
accordingly, correcting her error:
J fetches some cereals called "Frootloops" out of their box, and
his mother tells him to finish his own frootloops first. J corrects
her: "ne, Tuka pupus auf" ["No, L eat frootloops"]; he did not
fetch them for himself. Then he feeds him.
Shortly after this, J tried to make others meet L’s needs:
L has just finished his slice of toast, then J pushes his plate
towards his mother: "bitte Lutas Bot geme! Lutas mehr Bot
hame!" ["please give L bread! L wants more bread!"]
Furthermore, J told other people about events they did not observe:
J tells his father that L slept in the pram while his mother, J, and
L were shopping (L is now awake and in the kitchen with the
others): "Buggy Tuka häte noch" ["L sleep in the pram"]
As illustrated by the latter example, J talked about past and future
events from the age of 30 months. Thus, the ability to talk about temporally
remote events emerged in line with the ability to convey information to
others. Now, J seemed to have learned that language may not only serve as
an expression of experience, but also as an alternative to it.
7. Discussion: Learning to Convey Information
The analysis of J’s talk about his younger brother proved that – in this area
of talk – he rarely appeared to try to convey information to people who
already knew. Instead, there was a distinct development in the functions of
his speech. Initially, J liked to put whatever he saw or felt into words,
obviously enjoying his new ability to do so, employing solely the
representational function of language. At that time (i.e., from about 18 to
30 months), it did not seem to matter much whether there was an addressee
or not. During J’s third year of life, his utterances increasingly reflected a
desire to explain, elaborate, or share an emotional experience with an
addressee. In those utterances, the interpersonal function seemed to be
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predominant. Starting from the age of two and a half years, J managed to
convey information to others, increasingly appearing to take into account
the state of knowledge of his interlocutor. Now, all three metafunctions of
linguistic communication were employed.
These results show that the earliest functions of the child’s talk about
his brother are predominantly representational, expressing reflections on
(shared) experience that do not necessitate perspective taking. Later on,
interpersonal functions emerge, which involve emotional sharing with the
interlocutor, but not necessarily any understanding of the listener’s mind.
The function of information conveyance emerges only after the other
functions of talk. Starting with explanations and elaborations of situations
observable by both interlocutors, the child becomes increasingly able to
convey information which is new to the listener.
Talk which serves the predominant function of conveying information
is most effective when the child takes into account the listener’s
informational status, although it is of course possible (and often the case
even in later years) that the child simply mentions facts without considering
the listeners’ interests and previous knowledge. However, the interlocutors’
knowledge and beliefs are irrelevant for the other speech functions
developed earlier, while for the speech function acquired last, the
conveyance of information, they are not. Thus, at an earlier age, children
do not need to take into account others’ conceptual perspectives in talking,
and this may be one reason why they do not exhibit sophisticated
perspective taking skills (apart from those involved in learning language at
all, as claimed, e.g., by Tomasello et al. 1996). The option of dealing with,
and affecting, their interaction partners’ informational status simply does
not exist before children have learned how to use language as a substitution
for experience, i.e., to present experiential meaning to others who have no
access to the experience itself.
The age at which this ability emerged in the present study, i.e., at about
two and a half years, corresponds to the age at which the target child, like
other children (e.g., Dunn & Kendrick 1982), started to adapt linguistically
to his younger brother (Tenbrink 1998). This is reflected by the fact that the
language he directed to his brother differed in several respects (complexity,
vocabulary, etc.) from that with which he addressed his mother. This
correspondence of linguistic and conceptual perspective taking confirms
the finding that at this age, the interaction partners’ needs become
increasingly relevant to the child.
WHY SHOULD CHILDREN ADAPT, AND WHEN?
516
8. Conclusion
During their third year of life, children learn to adapt to their interaction
partner in linguistic form. Talking to younger children, they use features
such as shorter sentences, repetitions, etc., reminiscent of the language
mothers employ towards very young children. Towards older people,
adaptation in form is difficult as they are linguistically superior.
Regarding the content of utterances, taking into account the
interlocutor’s needs is especially important if the speaker intends to convey
information. In children’s everyday life, the conveyance of information is
only peripheral. When they begin to speak, children do not convey
information at all, and they do not seem to want to. Rather, they put events
into words, sometimes with and sometimes without involving an
interlocutor. Increasingly, however, interpersonal functions such as sharing
emotional involvement arise. Finally, information may be conveyed at
times, firstly by explaining (or elaborating on) a present, rather obvious
situation, but increasingly effective with regard to the interlocutor’s state of
knowledge.
Experiments on children’s theory of mind mostly concentrate on
whether children are able to consider other people’s beliefs under certain
circumstances; whereas home observation sheds light on in what kind of
situations such ability is relevant in natural interaction. As the
informational function emerges later than the other functions, other
people’s knowledge and beliefs – which are especially important for the
conveyance of information – are, to the child, irrelevant before the child
has learned to use all functions of language.
Future research needs to address at least three issues:
First, as the present study concentrated on only one specific area of
talk, the results need to be confirmed by an analysis of data containing a
broader range of topics.
Second, the conceptual development analysed here (from simple
representation of reality to successful conveyance of new information)
should be reflected systematically on the linguistic surface. A detailed
structural analysis of the linguistic data is needed to work out the relation
of the child’s grammatical development to his conceptual development.
Finally, a closely related question is how interlocutors adapt to each
other dynamically during the course of interaction in order to achieve
effective communication. As far as linguistic form is concerned, this may
mean that the interlocutors negotiate the vocabulary and the linguistic level
of utterances. With regard to content, both interaction partners need
information about their interlocutor’s state of knowledge or belief, which
may also be negotiated in ongoing discourse. How children learn to use up-
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dated information about their interaction partner which constitutes a
contrast to their previous assumptions is a question that still remains to be
solved.
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